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Path Dependent Platforms: A Process Perspective on 
Enterprise Ecosystem Governance 
1. Introduction 
In their editorial to the workshop on the role of platforms for enterprise ecosystems, Beimborn 
et al. (2011: 4) emphasize that “the emergence of platforms as backbones for inter-
organizational cooperation and collaboration also impacts the way economic activity is 
organized.” In a similar vein, Tiwana et al. (2010: 686) argue that platform-based enterprise 
ecosystems actually constitute “complex alliance networks”, where an approach grounded in 
literature on inter-organizational relationships might be a helpful complement to “the 
burgeoning exclusively macro, two-sided markets literature in economics.” 
Conceptualizing the relationships between platform and module providers as historically 
contingent, inter-organizational processes exhibits both new explanatory potentials and 
methodological difficulties. Scholars in the tradition of the two-sided markets paradigm such 
as Economides and Katsamakas (2006) ask how collaborative or competitive the relationship 
between platform leader and providers of complementary goods should be. In contrast, 
focusing on inter-organizational relations (e.g., Dyer and Singh 1998) would acknowledge 
that such a question cannot be decided in the abstract but rather depends, among others, on a 
platform‟s governance history and expected future.  
Coming from such an organization-theory perspective, it might sound odd to combine such an 
approach with insights from path dependence theory, which again roots in works by the 
economists David (1985) and Arthur (1989). The reason for this choice is threefold: first, 
while we do want to strengthen the role of managerial contingency in platform governance, 
we want to warn against overstating managerial leeway too. Second, as pointed out by 
Langlois (2002: 25), modular innovation promoted by platforms might come at the cost of 
increasing costs of systemic innovation. Third, recent applications of path dependence theory 
in an organizational realm (see, for example, Sydow et al. 2009; Dobusch 2010) sensitize for 
rigidities or even lock-ins in particular, which may result from initially successful governance 
practices. All these points taken together imply following the recommendation by Tiwana et 
al. (2010: 685) to “explicitly consider the possibility of nonlinear and threshold effects.” 
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2. Theory: Platform Evolution as a Path Dependent Process 
Platforms can be conceptualized as a collection of interdependent standards (Battaglia et al. 
2004). These standards are necessary on multiple levels such a data formats, interfaces or 
module design and enable the interplay of different modules which are jointly operated to 
provide a composite outcome.  
As soon as one acknowledges that, specifically in technological contexts, standards require 
adaptation, a dynamic perspective on standards – or better: standardization – is needed. 
Recently, Tiwana et al. (2010) took such a process perspective in a commentary trying to 
carve out interesting research questions with regard to platform evolution. Theoretically, 
however, Tiwana et al. juxtapose four different perspectives, ranging from modular systems 
theory over evolutionary selection and real options theory to bounded rationality approaches. 
The path dependence perspective described below is somewhat orthogonal to these four 
theoretical lenses. Path dependence is, first of all, a phenomenon. Interpreted broadly, path 
dependence is equivalent with the truism that “history matters” or, in the words of Teece and 
Pisano (1994), that “bygones are rarely bygones.” 
In a more narrow sense, which was specifically developed in the realm of technological 
standardization processes, one can speak of path dependence as a theoretical conception. 
Those researchers, who intentionally use “path dependence” in such a theoretical and not in a 
merely metaphorical or heuristic way, overwhelmingly locate their work in the tradition of 
David (1985) and Arthur (1989), who modelled non-ergodic, history-determined processes as 
an alternative to the widespread economic assumptions of equilibrium and efficiency.  
Recently, Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2009) have tried to systematize this approach and to 
extend its scope of applicability beyond the field of technological standardization into the 
realm of organizational processes. In a nutshell, Sydow et al. (2009: 691; emphasis in 
original) “suggest subdividing the whole process of evolving path dependence into three 
stages governed by different causal regimes and constituting different settings for 
organizational action and decision making” (see Figure 1). The theoretical core is positive 
feedback mechanisms (phase II), which link initial contingencies (phase I) with an eventual 
state of hyperstability called “lock-in” (phase III). Path dependence is thus to be located in the 
realm of mechanism-based theorizing, which aims to explain social phenomena by identifying 
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the processes through which they are generated (Davis and Marquis 2005). On this level of 
abstraction path dependence is a theoretical umbrella term covering various processual 
empirical phenomena. 
 
Figure 1: Phases of a path dependent process (taken from Sydow et al. 2009: 692) 
The next three subsections are devoted to explaining the peculiarities of each of the three 
phases of such a path dependent process. We thereby try to allude to current discussions on 
platform-based enterprise ecosystems where we see fit (for details on the following see 
Sydow et al. 2009 as well as Dobusch and Kapeller 2011). 
2.1 Preformation: Platforms between Path Creation and Emergence 
In the beginning of path dependent processes there is contingency. It is at this stage where 
comparably “small events” (Arthur 1989) play a decisive role. Arthur (1989: 117-118) argues 
that small events matter since they “are not averaged away and „forgotten‟ by the dynamics – 
they may decide the outcome” but at the same time “are outside the ex-ante knowledge of the 
observer – beyond the resolving power of his „model‟ or abstraction of the situation”; the 
latter is what makes small events responsible for the ex-ante non-ergodicity of path dependent 
processes. 
Consistent with this definition of small events are thus both “unpredictable, non-purposive, 
and somewhat random events” (Vergne and Durand 2010: 11) and actors that are “able to 
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improvise and bricolage their ways through an emergent process” (Garud et al. 2010: 8). 
Theorizing from the perspective of the actors involved in the process: what appears as purely 
random for one observer may be attributed causally to intentional actions by another one. 
Thus even a “big event” at the time being is included as it may appear as a small and random 
event in retrospect (Sydow et al. 2009: 693). 
In the context of platform governance, we can also observe both these perspectives. For one, 
regularly platforms are (re-)designed being under the expectation of increasing difficulties to 
change certain standards at later stages of process (Langlois 2002; Tiwana et al. 2010). But 
even such a path creation perspective faces the challenges of unanticipated developments 
(Baldwin and Woodward 2009) and, more generally, of unintentional consequences of 
intentional decision-making (Giddens 1984). 
For another, not all platform-related developments are immediately recognized in terms of 
their potential for path dependent outcomes. This is particularly true for processes taking 
place on complementary but reciprocally interrelated levels such as technological standards 
and organizational structures (see Dobusch 2010). In such cases of path emergence, the 
respective dynamics can be considered to take place behind the back of the agents – at least 
until the rise of a seemingly superior alternative makes the path visible.  
In both cases of path creation and emergence, the end of the historically contingent 
preformation phase is reached as soon as positive feedback kicks in. 
2.2 Formation: Positive Feedback between Technology and Organization 
Many cases of platform technologies such as the DVD (Dranove and Gandal 2003) or mobile 
telecommunication standards (Koski and Kretschmer 2005) are explained via positive 
feedback with increasing returns to adoption that occur for several reasons (for a 
comprehensive discussion of positive feedback mechanisms, see Dobusch and Schüßler 
2007).  
First, platform technologies, specifically with high levels of modularity (Langlois 2002), are 
accompanied with high set-up, but low manufacturing costs, and costs fall rapidly as sales 
increase. Such dynamic economies of scale enable first movers to reinvest the returns in 
product innovation, thus making further growth more likely. Second, platforms become more 
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attractive the more they are adopted due to network effects. In the realm of platform 
technologies, the most important type are indirect network effects, stemming from the variety 
and quality of complementary goods – modules – supplied by third parties – the enterprise 
ecosystem –, thus making the platform technology more attractive for current and potential 
users (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Weitzel et al. 2006). Third, there are learning effects with 
regard to both the platform (on the side of module providers and consumers) and the 
individual modules (on the side of consumers). Once users of a particular platform and/or 
platform-specific modules have invested in training, they are “grooved in” to the technology 
(Arthur 1996: 103) and experience switching costs when changing to an alternative 
technology. Fourth, not only the extant installed base but also expected future choices of other 
agents matter. The platform “that is expected to become the standard will become the 
standard. Self-fulfilling expectations are one manifestation of positive-feedback economics 
and bandwagon effects” (Shapiro and Varian 1999: 13-14; italics by the authors) 
Mechanism category Description of the mechanism 
Coordination effects The more something is done, the greater the benefits (also for the individual 
actor) of doing it. 
Complementarity 
effects 
Adding more complementary items to a system makes using the system more 
attractive 
Expectation effects Anticipation of the choices of others leads to local decisions and can result in a 
self-reinforcing pattern on a population level 
Investment and 
learning effects 
An investment (cognitive, emotional, financial) leads to further investment into 
the same 
Table 1: Categories of positive feedback mechanisms (adapted taken from Sydow et al. 2009) 
These more or less well known examples of positive feedback in technology markets may be 
further complicated – reinforced – by complementary dynamics within or between 
organizations. In the still young field of organizational path dependence, Sydow et al. (2009) 
consequently speak of “self-reinforcement” and distinguish four mechanism categories: 
coordination effects, complementarity effects, adaptive expectations and learning effects (see 
Table 1). While being similar to the mechanisms discussed in the context of technological 
standardization, these categories refer to (inter-)organizational rules, resources, practices, and 
strategies.  
In the context of platforms, the interplay between technological and (inter-) organizational 
structures may best be illustrated by pointing to “everyone‟s favorite example” (Shapiro and 
Varian 1999: 24) for phenomena such as increasing returns or lock-in: Microsoft Windows. In 
desktop software markets the literature is full of descriptions how the large installed base of 
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Windows leads application programmers to develop their software predominantly for that 
platform – specifically in the field of special purpose applications with rather small niche 
markets. This, in turn, makes the platform Windows more attractive for users that value 
software diversity and application quality (see, for example, Shapiro and Varian 1999). 
Another much more organizational part of this story remains however often untold. 
Organizational adopters of Windows adapt their organizational routines and structures to the 
standard and, over time, build up huge stocks of platform specific competencies and special 
purpose applications. As a consequence, Microsoft needs not fear substantial competition in 
its core markets even though functionally equivalent alternatives on open source basis have 
been available for over a decade now (for details see Dobusch 2008, 2010). Organizational 
users of Microsoft Windows are locked-in. 
2.3 Lock-in: Platform, Module Providers and Users 
The final lock-in phase of a path dependent process represents a situation where no viable – in 
terms of switching efforts – alternative to a given technology, institution or strategy can be 
realized. This broad definition already points to the fact that in the context of platform 
technologies all three groups of actors – platform and module providers as well as 
platform/module users – might be locked-in. Referencing Giddens (1984), Sydow et al. (2009, 
694) argue that a lock-in may be of a predominantly cognitive, normative, or resource-based 
nature; while on the market level a lock-in can gain “deterministic character” in form of 
(technological) monopoly, in the organizational realm Sydow et al. (2009, 695) “suggest 
conceptualizing the final stage of a path dependent process in a less restrictive way – as a 
predominant social influence, leaving some scope for variation.” 
Methodologically, however, the state of lock-in is virtually inseparable from the previous 
stages of positive feedback mechanisms and path creation/emergence: even the empirical 
question whether positive feedback can still be found in situations of alleged lock-in requires 
identification and measurement of these very mechanisms. The question whether any other 
alternative would have been or still was viable or even superior compared to the status quo, 
might in turn require ideographic reasoning susceptible to the idiosyncrasies of the case at 
hand. 
3 Discussion: Implications for Ecosystem governance 
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With regard to governance of platform-based enterprise ecosystems, which regularly means 
taking the perspective of a focal platform leader (cf. Beimborn et al. 2011), two issues seem to 
be particularly interesting for further research. First, when and why does successful path 
creation turn into inefficient path dependence? Second, how can inefficient paths be broken? 
3.1 Paths from Efficiency to Inefficiency 
The original economic debates on path dependence were dominated by the claim that, under 
certain circumstances, markets might lead to inefficient outcomes (see David 1985, 2001; 
Liebowitz and Margolis 1990, 1994). In the most recent works on path dependence this 
dispute has been settled with the consensus that paths should be considered “potentially 
inefficient” (Sydow et al. 2009: 692). 
For the designer of a platform for enterprise ecosystems, creating a path that exhibits 
substantial positive feedback effects among module providers and platform users is a 
desirable goal. Successful design of platform characteristics in terms of architecture, 
interfaces and standards (Langlois 2002) may then lead to growing adoption up to a point, 
where the positive feedback leads to further platform adoption. Success breeds success. 
It is however exactly this self-supporting dynamic that already contains the seed for failure in 
the future. While platform adoption is still rising, this might be more and more due to network 
effects and less due to the right design and governance decisions. For one, the rate of 
innovation might decrease due to reduced competitive pressures. For another, platform leaders 
might be tempted to exploit their powerful position vis-à-vis both module providers and/or 
platform users. Taken together, these dynamics might then fuel radical innovation outside of 
the platform-based ecosystem.  
For research, this raises difficult questions. How can the different sources of platform success 
be differentiated empirically? What is attributable to network effects and other forms of 
positive feedback, what to platform quality? These are questions also of highly practical value 
for managers of successful platforms, who want to avoid falling into a “success trap”, where 
success breeds success breeds failure. 
3.2 Path-breaking? 
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The second question, how inefficient paths can be broken, can again be asked from three 
different perspectives – platform and module providers as well as platform users. In the 
literature, the dominant issue for all three groups of actors is switching costs (Shapiro and 
Varian 1999); this question is, however, only pertinent if there is an alternative, which is 
considered to be functionally viable by the actors of interest. Furthermore, under 
circumstances of anticipated path dependent dynamics, current viability might be even less 
important than expected viability, which in turn depends on the expectations of other actors in 
the field. This points to the fact that switching costs are only a small part of the story in path 
dependent processes. 
From a research perspective, the difficulty lies also deciding whether we have a case of 
“unlocking” or „path-breaking“ (e.g. Sydow et al. 2009) or whether there was no path 
dependence in the first place.  
4 Conclusions and Outlook 
In the realm of platform-based enterprise ecosystems, path dependent developments are likely 
to not be the exception but the rule. Many – if not most – of the core design decisions are 
contingently made upfront and become increasingly difficult to change as the ecosystem gains 
momentum; distinguishing between different categories of positive feedback mechanisms 
may be helpful to systematize the explanation of these developments and to cover the 
interaction between technological and organizational dynamics. The latter is of particular 
importance, since platform success due to increasing returns to adoption may crowd out 
innovation incentives or inspire defunct governance practices, which then lead to platform 
demise in the long run.  
When addressing the issue of a path‟s (in-)efficiency, the most important question to clarify is 
who should be considered as being path dependent. While actions of all three groups of actors 
– platform providers, module developers, and platform users – together create and shape a 
path dependent process, the implications on each of the groups leeway my be far from 
symmetrical. For future research on path dependence in platform-based enterprise 
ecosystems, this implies combining an interorganizational perspective in evaluating platform 
governance with a clear focus on one type of actor in assessing potential path dependent 
dynamics. 
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